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There is a vast theoretical literature in economics about the importance
of risk aversion for the analysis of decision making under risk and uncer-
tainty. The majority of studies that employ utility functions for modelling or
calibration purposes assume a particular functional specification. Although
the original work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) suggested that relative
risk aversion increases with wealth (IRRA),1 the most commonly used util-
ity specification is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). This property
implies that all agents, regardless of their level of wealth, will allocate the
same proportion of their wealth to risky assets. However, empirical work
that estimates the shape of risk preferences with actual financial and wealth
variables, and how those preferences evolve over time, is very limited and
there has been no consensus. Empirical studies have provided evidence for
all three hypotheses about individual risk aversion: increasing relative risk
aversion (IRRA) (Arrow, 1965; Siegel and Hoban, 1982), decreasing relative
risk aversion (DRRA) (Bellante and Green 2004; Cohn et al. 1975; Morin
and Suarez 1983) and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) (Friend and
Blume 1975).
Most empirical studies have been based on cross-sectional data (Arrow
1965; Bellante and Green 2004; Cohn et al. 1975; Friend and Blume 1975;
Morin and Suarez 1983; Siegel and Hoban 1982). This empirical framework
cannot, however, identify whether the observed distribution of the risky-asset
share across heterogeneous agents comes exclusively from a common form of
individual preferences or from different risk aversion parameters conditional
on wealth levels.2 The evidence gathered by cross-sectional analysis would
only be informative of the shape of preferences if risk aversion was inde-
pendent of wealth.3 Work using panel data, on the other hand, does not
need to build in such an assumption because it removes the time-invariant
1In an earlier paper, Markowitz (1952) proposed a value function over changes in wealth
that exhibits loss aversion, and that is convex over small gains but concave over larger
ones.
2This point is formally verified in Chiappori and Paiella (2011, Section 2).
3Recent attempts to infer risk profiles within the population have been done using
laboratory or field experiments, as well as surveys. See e.g. Vieider et al. (2015) for an
international analysis of incentivised as well as survey measures of risk and uncertainty, and
how those different measures correlate within contexts and methods, as well as between
countries.
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unobserved heterogeneity using first differences. This method allows the re-
searcher to distinguish between individual preferences and the variation of
risk aversion with wealth.
Two prominent papers in this area are Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008)
(BN) in a study of the US, and Chiappori and Paiella (2011) (CP) in a
study about Italian households. The latter paper is based on a standard two-
period portfolio choice model that uses a first-order Taylor series expansion to
maximize end-of-period expected utility. Under this set-up the share of risky
assets in the portfolio will be constant as long as the coefficient of relative risk
aversion remains constant. CP use panel data for Italian Households (SHIW)
from 1989 to 2004. They do not find statistically significant elasticity of the
risky-asset share, which does not reject the CRRA hypothesis.
While both CP and BN share the same null hypothesis in their empiri-
cal analyses –CRRA– BN are more specific about the alternative hypothesis
defined as the habit model of consumption. They are the first ones to inves-
tigate the standard portfolio allocation model with habits using household
panel data.4 In their model, agents’ welfare depends not only on the abso-
lute consumption level but also on the difference between their consumption
and their reference level (Becker and Murphy, 1988) and this generates time-
varying relative risk aversion. As a result of this, agents have to invest in
risk-free assets to provide sufficient financial resources to ensure that future
consumption can always be kept above the level of the habit, which in turn,
tie the optimal demand for riskless assets to the slow-moving habit level.
Thus, when liquid wealth fluctuates, the optimal risky-asset share should
adjust accordingly. In particular, when liquid wealth increases the utility
maximization share of risky assets increases, and vice versa. Effectively, rel-
ative risk aversion varies with wealth.
Despite the relatively successful role of habit formation in explaining dy-
namic asset pricing phenomena and macroeconomic stylised facts5 the micro
4Other papers have examined household portfolio composition in a cross-sectional
framework, for instance, Blake (1996), and Guiso and Paiella (2008). However, the time
variation of panel data allows the analysis to separate household preferences and the joint
distribution of risk aversion and wealth.
5For instance, the equity premium puzzle (Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and
Cochrane, 1999), the equity home bias (Shore and White, 2002), the hump-shaped response
of aggregate variables to monetary shocks (Fuhrer, 2000), or countercyclical markups
(Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006).
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evidence supporting the habit formation consumption model is mixed, and
the micro-data evidence that supports the prediction about time varying rela-
tive risk aversion is scarce.6 BN employ data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and fail to find a significant positive relationship between
wealth and the share of risky assets, concluding against habit formation.
Our paper extends the existing literature on this topic in several aspects.
We will, for the first time, use UK household panel data to examine how
individuals distribute their portfolio holdings between risky and riskless as-
sets. Our analysis of the elasticity of the risky asset share to total financial
wealth will employ the most comprehensive measure of background wealth
used in this type of studies. Pension wealth is one of the largest components
of wealth and, as a novelty, we will include it, together with home equity,
equity in private business and liquid wealth, in one of our measures of to-
tal wealth.7 While we will initially assume that pension wealth is overall
a safe investment, we will also examine households’ elasticity of the risky
asset share to wealth when it is assumed that pension wealth is part of the
risky-asset portfolio. This is particularly relevant given the current tendency
for employer-sponsored pension plans to rely more on defined contributions
instead of defined benefits, and because of the widespread use of individually
managed retirement funds (see Post et al. 2014). The choice of country and
time period is also unique as it is the first paper to analyse the nature of
households’ utility function using panel data for the UK for a sample period
that includes episodes of economic and financial turbulence such as the great
recession.
Our empirical analysis provides evidence on the specific form of house-
holds’ preferences for a wide range of assumptions about what is the relevant
background wealth investors consider in formulating their investment deci-
sions, from liquid wealth only to liquid wealth in addition to equity in private
6One of the earliest attempts to test the habit model of consumption was Dynan (2000).
He employed household data for the US from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
and found no support for the model. A more positive result is found in a study by Ravina
(2005) that tests for internal and external habit motives in consumption using the Credit
Card Panel for California. Studies that use aggregate data rather than micro data have
also found evidence to support the habit model of consumption (e.g. Korniotis, 2010).
7As it will become apparent in section 3 below for the case of the UK, while pension is
for many households, especially those towards the high end of the distribution, the largest
component of wealth, home equity is the largest factor for the majority of households.
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business, home equity, and pension wealth. Our results are in general con-
sistent with the evidence provided by BN and CP. We do not find support
for the thesis that positive changes in wealth increase the share invested in
risky assets.
Support for CRRA or IRRA depends crucially on the measure of wealth
and on the classification of pension as either risky or risk free. If the definition
of wealth is restricted to liquid wealth, the marginal effect of wealth changes
on the risky asset share is nil, and households would be characterised as
exhibiting CRRA. This is also the case when the broadest definiton of wealth
is used and pension is characterised as a risky investment. On the other hand,
if pension wealth is considered to be risk free, our results support IRRA,
implying that a marginal increase in wealth induces households, on average,
to rebalance their portfolio proportionately more towards safer assets.
We complete our analysis by exploiting the fact that the cross-sectional
analysis can provide an estimation of the joint distribution of wealth and
risk aversion if one is ready to assume CRRA. We provide such estimate for
the case of liquid wealth and find a negative but small correlation between
measured risk aversion and wealth. It is worth noting that, in this case, our
average estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 2.39, similar to
the one obtained by Friend and Blume (1975) for the UK and by CP for Italy,
and considerably larger than the one implied by, for instance, logarithmic
utility functions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets up the model
of asset allocation while section 3 describes the data and discusses the econo-
metric methodology. The empirical results are presented in section 4. Section
5 discusses the distribution of relative risk aversion across households for the
case of liquid wealth, and section 6 concludes.
2. Asset Allocation Model
The starting point is the standard two period portfolio choice model.
Households with utility function U and initial wealth Wt can invest in a
risk-free asset with return Rf , and in a risky asset with random return Rm
and variance σ2. The problem of the agent is to choose the optimal share of






E[U(Wt+1)] = E {U [Wt(1 +Rf + αt(Rm −Rf ))]} . (1)
Using a first-order Taylor approximation of the utility function and ob-













− log γt. (3)
This set up is similar to the one employed by CP and we refer to their
paper for further details and discussion about the multiperiod setting of the
model. It follows from this equation that the share of risky assets in the
portfolio will be constant as long as the coefficient of relative risk aversion
remains constant. Alternatively, variations in the proportion of wealth in-
vested in risky assets would be driven by changes in the relative risk aversion
parameter. This is the case, for instance, for IRRA as initially suggested by
Arrow (1965, 1971).
BN employ an extension of the standard portfolio choice model and in-
corporate consumption habit. This set up implies DRRA. BN show that,
within their framework, the optimal portfolio share, αt, varies over time only
due to the variation of the ratio of the habit component of consumption over
the wealth that has not been used for consumption. It follows from their
model that, if habit formation generates time-varying relative risk aversion,
one should expect households’ share of the risky assets to positively respond
to post-consumption wealth. In empirical terms, their model implies that the
coefficient of wealth as a regressand of αt should be statistically significant
and positive.
3. Data and Econometric Model
The dataset is from the UK data service Wealth and Assets Survey
(WAS). It is a longitudinal survey of households across Great Britain: Eng-
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land, Wales and Scotland (excluding North of the Caledonian Canal and the
Isles of Scilly). WAS gathers comprehensive information about household
wealth, collecting data on a wide range of assets and liabilities that private
individuals and households in Great Britain hold. We employ all three waves
that have been so far released, and each wave spans a period of two years.
Wave 1 started in July 2006 where a total of 30,500 households and 53,300
adults were interviewed. Respondents to Wave 1 of the survey were invited
to take part in a follow up interview two years later, from July 2008 to June
2010, to create Wave 2. This second wave included 20,000 households and
34,500 adults. The third wave of the survey was conducted between July
2010 and June 2012, and it included 21,451 household and 40,396 individu-
als.8,9 The time period of this analysis is particularly interesting since they
cover the last one or two years of the peak of a business cycle and the two
years of a very significant recession that includes a financial crisis.
We impose a number of restrictions for those households that will be
included in our analysis.10 The household has to be involved in at least two
continuous waves of surveys and to have positive wealth. We further require
that the marital status of the household reference person (HRP) remained
unchanged during two consecutive waves of the survey and that there are no
assets moved in or out of the household as a consequence of a family member
moving in or out of the family. The household is excluded from the analysis
if the HRP is retired in a subsequent wave.
3.1. Definition of variables
The asset allocation model described in section 2 will be initially esti-
mated using a comprehensive measure of wealth, total wealth, which is the
sum of household pension wealth, home equity, equity in private business, liq-
uid wealth and wealth in collectables. This definition of total wealth leaves
human capital as the only component of background wealth which is not
included.
Total wealth = pension wealth + home equity + equity in private business
+ liquid wealth + wealth in collectables
8To make magnitudes comparable over time, we have deflated all income and wealth
data by the consumer price index (CPI) into January 2006 British pound.
9In both wave 2 and wave 3, new households and individuals were added into the survey.
10These conditions are similar to the ones in the analysis of BN.
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WAS only provides the figure for the aggregate household total wealth on
pension.11 It does not therefore include information about how households
allocate their pension funds among the different components. Collard (2009)
reviews research, mainly done in the US and UK, about financial decisions in
general, and investment behaviour in relation to pensions, in particular. The
evidence suggests that UK households, when considering long-term invest-
ments such as pensions, are more concerned about minimising financial losses
than maximising financial returns.12 Furthermore, one of the conclusions in
a survey of the UK shows that the majority of respondents considered that a
pension scheme linked to the stock market was too risky (Clery et al. 2007).
We therefore initially assume that pension wealth is overall an investment in
risk free assets. However, pension systems have gone through wide-ranging
changes over the last two decades and experienced an increase in the num-
ber of defined contribution plans as well as self-invested personal pensions
(see e.g. Post et al. 2014). We establish two alternative classifications for
pension wealth, risky and risk free, to reflect this tendency and the fact that
households may regard the stream of income derived from this investment as
not free of uncertainty.
Home equity is defined as the sum of all property values less the value
of all mortgages and amounts owed as a result of equity release. We con-
sider housing wealth to be a risky asset (see Banks et al. 2010) which seems
particularly relevant around the time of the latest financial crisis of 2007-09
and its aftermath. Equity in private business is defined as the net wealth
in private businesses and will also be included as part of the risky portfo-
lio. The liquid wealth is defined as the difference between liquid assets and
11WAS provides the sum of nine separate components that are not available sepa-
rately: defined benefits (DB), additional voluntary contributions to DB schemes, employer-
provided defined contributions (DC), personal pensions, pensions already in receipt, re-
tained rights in DB-type schemes, retained rights in DC-type schemes, pension funds from
which the individual is taking income drawdown, and pensions expected in future from a
former spouse. The values of some of these pension components are directly reported by
the household during the interview, while some other components were calculated sepa-
rately. More information about how pension wealth is calculated in WAS can be found
at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/specific/economy/wealth-
and-assets-survey/wealth-and-assets-survey—user-guidance/index.html
12Collard also notes that qualitative research for a target group shows that subjects
were mostly interested in low-risk investment.
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debt.13 The wealth in collectables is the total value of collectables own by
the household.
To make our study of the UK comparable to previous work, such as BN
and CP, that employ narrower definitions of wealth we also consider the
following alternative definitions:
Wealth 1 = liquid wealth + home equity
Wealth 2 = liquid wealth + equity in private business
Wealth 3 (liquid wealth) = liquid assets - debt
Given the four different measures of wealth the proportion of wealth in-
vested in risky assets, αt, which constitutes the dependent variable in the
forthcoming empirical analysis, will have four alternative definitions depend-
ing on the wealth variable that is used:14
Total risky assets share =UK and overseas shares+home equity+private business equity+collectables
total wealth
Total risky assets share 2= UK and overseas shares + home equity + private business equity + collectables+pension
total wealth
Risky assets share 1 = UK and overseas shares+home equity
wealth 1
Risky assets share 2= UK and overseas shares+private business equity
wealth 2
Risky assets share 3 (liquid risky asset share)= UK and overseas shares
liquid assets
3.2. Summary statistics
Table 1 presents pooled cross-section/time-series statistics for all house-
holds that satisfy the criteria described above to be included in our sample.
Property and pension wealth are not surprisingly the largest components of
wealth. Both of their averages together make up about seventy five percent
of average total wealth, while average liquid wealth only represents around
fifteen percent. Wealth in stock market equity and private businesses is
heavily skewed towards the top end of the household distribution. Thirteen
13Liquid assets are the sum of holdings of UK and overseas shares plus riskless assets that
include ISAs, cash-like assets, holdings of bonds, and the value of endowments purchased
to repay mortgages. The debt comprises non-mortgage debt such as credit card debt and
consumer loans.
14In line with several other studies, we use liquid assets, rather than liquid wealth, to
calculate the risky asset share (risky assets share 3). This is because liquid wealth could
be very close to zero for some households.
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percent of the households in the sample entered the stock market in subse-
quent waves when they were not holding any stock at the time of the previous
wave. Twenty-five percent of the sample did leave the market in subsequent
waves while they were holding stocks in a previous wave. The market partic-
ipants are defined as households holding stock market equity in consecutive
waves.
Thirty one percent of the observations are market participants. Our em-
pirical analysis is based on those households and table 2 displays the sum-
mary statistics.15 The stylised facts are very similar to the ones for the full
sample except for that the averages are higher. This implies that those who
participate in the stock market have, on average, higher income and wealth.
The liquid risky asset share for this subset of households is much higher than
for the whole sample, 21.8% relative to 8.4%. Over the three-wave period,
total wealth increases, but all other three measures of wealth decrease.
We finish the discussion about the descriptive statistics by comparing
data from the UK and the US. Following earlier work in this area, we use
US household wealth data from the PSID. The period used is 1999-2003 that
includes three two-year period survey waves. We impose similar restrictions
to include households in the analysis.16 The PSID does not provide data
on pensions. The data displayed in tables 3 and 4 reveal some interesting
differences across the two countries. The two most notable ones are (i) the
composition of household wealth: households in the US hold a higher propor-
tion of liquid assets and equity of their private businesses, while households
in the UK hold higher proportions of home equity; and (ii) households in the
US hold a much higher proportion of liquid risky assets, 33.7% for the whole
US sample relative to 8.4% for the UK.
3.3. Econometric Model
The aim of the empirical analysis is to find out what type of risk aversion
discussed above is supported by the data, DRRA, CRRA or IRRA. In order
15For the cross-section analysis, market participants are defined as households holding
stock market equity at current wave of survey (at time t). The summary statistics for
these households are available upon request.
16In particular, we require marital status of the HRP, employment status of the HRP,
and structure of household to stay the same. We end up including 3,914 observations. All
the wealth and income data are inflated into 2006 dollars. The US data is collected in
1999, 2001 and 2003.
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to correctly specify the econometric model we need to address issues such as
the presence of external factors affecting both wealth and risky-asset shares,
factors affecting all households simultaneously, self-selection of the sample,
and possible measurement error.
First, we consider factors that may cause common movements in the level
of wealth, Wt, and the share of risky assets, αt. This is the case of life-cycle
components that can be considered to generate a correlated deterministic
pattern over time between an agent’s wealth and the proportion invested in
risky assets. The life-cycle controls will be collectively denoted as qt−k, with
k = 2 years, and include the following variables:
Life-cycle controls: age and age squared of the HRP, indicators for ed-
ucation for the HRP, interaction terms of education level with age and age
squared, dummy variables for the gender of the HRP and their interaction
with age and age squared, marital status, health status, the number of chil-
dren in the household, the number of people in the household, log of family
income at previous wave, and the value of inheritance received within two
years before the previous wave of the survey. The value of inheritance is
scaled by income to adjust for the fact that a given amount of inheritance
has a different effect for households with different levels of income.
We consider another set of control variables to capture major changes
in the composition of the household or the asset ownership that could lead
to preference shifts which could possibly be correlated with changes in the
share of risky assets. These variables will be collectively denoted by ∆ht and
include the following
Preference shifters: changes in family size, changes in the number of chil-
dren in the household, dummy for business ownership and a dummy variable
that indicates if the family acquired a house during the period of the survey.17
The empirical model also needs to control for factors that would affect all
households simultaneously. The reason is that, for those factors, the portfolio
adjustment would be made via prices rather than quantities. To isolate the
effect of habit, factors that change aggregate wealth and asset holding should
be controlled for, and these will be denoted by At :
Aggregate changes: time fixed effects, and interaction of year and regional
dummies.
17Preference shifters are not employed in the cross-sectional model.
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The econometric model is therefore based on the following regression,
∆αt = βqt−k + θ∆ht + φAt + ρ∆wt + εt. (4)
The issue of measurement error in both the risky-asset share, αt, and
wealth, wt, in our regression equation is discussed in BN (section 2.3). In or-
der to avoid biases and inconsistencies in the parameter estimates we employ
a two-stage least square (TSLS) method to estimate ρ. The instrumental
variables for 4wt have to be uncorrelated with the residuals, but (partially)
correlated with changes in household wealth. We follow BN and choose
three instruments. The first two are quantile dummies for household income
growth between two consecutive waves, and the third one is inheritance re-
ceipts between the current wave of the survey and the previous wave (between
t and t− 2).18 These instruments are taken from survey questions, different
from the components of Wt, but correlated with household wealth. In the
results section below we still report both the OLS and TSLS because even
though the latter method deals with the problem of measurement error, their
estimates are less precise than the OLS ones.
Another econometric issue is that the regression only includes stock mar-
ket participants. This could lead to sample selection biases, since the house-
holds who are included in the sample are not randomly selected. They are
observed because those households participate in the stock market. Ignoring
the decisions of entry to or exit from the risky-asset market may lead to
misleading inference. In order to tackle this problem, regression results from
the Heckman two-step procedure are also reported.19
4. Empirical results
Prior to estimating the econometric model described above we investigate
a more general question about portfolio decisions made by UK households.
We analyse whether changes in wealth affect their decisions to enter or exit
the stock market. Although the results of this analysis are not informative
18The instrumental variables for the regression on the level are inheritance and total
household income.
19For the Heckman two-step model we use inheritance receipts between t and t − 2 as
an exclusion restriction (instrument) that affects the dichotomic variable in the first stage
but not the outcome in the second stage.
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about the degree of portfolio reallocation induced by changes in wealth, they
do, in any case, provide an interesting stylised fact.
4.1. Stock market participation
The decision to add stock market equity to a portfolio that does not
contain any, or to sell all the shares held in a portfolio at one point in time
is different from how much a portfolio that already includes risky assets
should be readjusted due to changes in wealth. The decision about to enter
or exit the stock market depends not only on the attitude toward risk but
also on issues such as fixed costs of participation (see Paiella 2007). The
results obtained from this analysis will therefore not be conclusive about
time-varying risk aversion but are, in any case, informative about portfolio
choices.
We employ a probit model to test whether the entry and exit decision
made by UK households over the period 2006-2012 is influenced by changes
in wealth. The results reported in table 5 are in line with expectations. The
regressions include all the life-cycle, preference shifters and aggregate change
controls discussed in the previous section. The results show that increases
in wealth marginally increase the likelihood of households to enter the stock
market, and decreases the likelihood of leaving the market.20 The magnitudes
of these point estimates are small, but they are not negligible either, and are
similar to the ones for the US reported in BN.
4.2. Total wealth
4.2.1. Cross sectional analysis
One of the contributions of this paper is to add pension wealth as part
of the background wealth of the agents. Tables 1 and 2 show that pension
wealth accounts for around forty percent of average total wealth. However,
previous research in this area has not been able to analyse portfolio deci-
sions that include pension wealth. WAS does provide researchers with this
opportunity because it reports the value of pension wealth for UK house-
holds. This allows us to construct a comprehensive measure of household
total wealth, which is the sum of liquid wealth, home equity, private busi-
ness equity, collectables, and pension. Table 6 displays the results of the
20Wealth is defined here as total wealth. We also employ the probit regression on the
other three levels of wealth and found similar results.
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cross-sectional analysis regression for the case of total wealth and total risky
asset share 1. The second column reports the results from the ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression. The estimated coefficient is negative but statisti-
cally insignificant. However, when the Heckman two-stage (HT) regression
is implemented to address sample selection bias, the point estimate becomes
significantly negative. In addition to this, significance of the Mills ratio indi-
cates further that sample selection bias may be present in the cross-sectional
analysis. The TSLS estimates reported in column four also show a signifi-
cantly negative coefficient. The first stage results in panel B indicate that
the instrumental variables have a significant partial correlation with total
wealth, with the expected signs, and high F-statistics.
Table 6 columns five to ten report the regression results based on two
restricted samples. The first one excludes households with wealth less than
5,000 pounds; and the second restricted sample excludes those whose wealth
changes are less than 25%. In other words, the first restricted sample focuses
on relatively wealthy households and the second one on households with
large wealth fluctuations. This robustness check deals with the potential
nonlinearity in portfolio adjustment derived from transaction costs. The
results from the restricted samples are largely unchanged compared to those
from the unrestricted sample, suggesting that the higher the total wealth the
lower the household investments in risky assets. In other words, our results
from cross-sectional regression overall suggest IRRA.
4.2.2. First differences analysis
One of the concerns related to the empirical work based on cross-sectional
data is that individuals’ risk preferences may be heterogeneous. This means
that the cross-sectional distribution of the share of risky assets in households’
portfolios depends not only on the form of individual preferences but also on
the joint distribution of wealth and risk aversion in the population. The
cross-sectional data cannot disentangle these two effects due to its lack of
time variation, and therefore potentially telling nothing about the shape of
risk preferences. This problem can be solved by using panel data to estimate
a first-difference model to eliminate the effects of preference heterogeneity.
The point estimates shown in table 7 are all significantly negative regard-
less of the estimation method or sample restrictions. The similarity of OLS
and HT estimates and the insignificance of the Mills ratio indicate that the
source of self-selection may be eliminated by taking first differences. The
TSLS estimates are larger in absolute value, indicating the possibility of
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measurement error in the OLS and HT estimates.21
Overall, results from table 7 suggest a negative risky assets share elas-
ticity to total wealth, providing further evidence in support of IRRA. This
finding implies that if, for example, total wealth were to increase, households
would proportionally increase their investment in safe assets such as bonds
or pensions, or put it differently, they would proportionally reduce their ex-
posure to risky assets such as shares, private businesses or home equity (also
by, possibly, increasing their leverage in home-related debt).22
4.2.3. Pension as risky investment
WAS does not provide separate data on the different elements of pen-
sion wealth which naturally differ in terms of their riskiness. Pension plans
have experienced considerable changes over the last two decades and there
is a tendency towards defined contribution as well as self-invested personal
pensions as discussed in previous sections. We take this fact into consid-
eration by considering an alternative specification. We include pensions as
part of the risky portfolio and estimate the elasticity of the risky asset share
to wealth using the variable Total risky assets share 2. Table 8 presents the
estimates for both the cross sectional and first differences data.23 In this case
CRRA cannot be rejected. This result is intuitive because, relative to tables
6 and 7, households now would not proportionately increase their share of
risk-free assets as their wealth increases if investment and stock in pensions
are considered to be risky. Under this assumption, households’ elasticity is
zero and the share of risky assets is not affected by changes in wealth.
4.3. Net equity in housing
Descriptive statistics show that net home equity accounts, on average,
for roughly one third of households’ total net wealth. Moreover, more than
21The first stage F-statistics for the TSLS have a value lower than ten, which may indi-
cate weak instruments. We therefore re-run our tests with a limited information maximum
likelihood (LIML) estimator and we obtained similar results. Overall, our TSLS results
in the first-difference analysis do not seem to be much affected by the weak instruments
problem. The results are available upon request.
22Guiso and Paiella (2008) provide empirical evidence of IRRA in their study of house-
holds in Italy. They use a direct survey measure of absolute risk aversion to examine the
relationship between wealth and risk aversion.
23Note that the first stage regressions in both cases are the same as the ones reported
in tables 6 and 7.
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ninety percent of households in our sample hold home equity in their port-
folio making it a very important asset to examine households’ investment
strategies.
The analysis based on the first-difference model shown in table 9 where
wealth is defined as liquid wealth plus home equity (wealth 1) finds evi-
dence of a negative relationship between changes in wealth and relative risk
aversion, which is in line with IRRA. The size of the negative coefficients is
slightly smaller than those in the table for total wealth. It is however worth
noting that this result is not entirely robust to subsamples for high wealth
or large wealth changes when TSLS is employed. For those cases, CRRA
cannot be rejected.24
4.4. Equity in private business
Equity in private business is a less liquid investment than other assets
included in the definition of wealth. This is because of the indivisibility
of the business equity holding and its lack of tradability which also makes
these assets riskier and with higher entry requirements. The proportion of
households that invest in private business is only about ten percent of the
stock market participants.
Table 10 reports the analysis in first differences using a measure of wealth
that includes the holding of private equity in addition to liquid wealth (wealth
2). The OLS and Heckman two-stage results generate significantly negative
coefficients, but once measurement error is considered, the coefficient be-
comes insignificant. The results from the two restricted samples are highly
consistent with the ones for the full sample. This analysis indicates that
fluctuations in wealth 2 are unlikely to affect the risky asset share and there
is no overwhelming evidence to reject the CRRA hypothesis.25
24The results of the cross-section analysis, not reported here but available upon request,
show that the point estimate from the OLS regression is not significant. However, if
sample selection bias and measurement errors are considered, the point estimates become
significantly negative, indicating a positive relationship between wealth and relative risk
aversion. This result may be explained by the fact that, in our UK sample, home equity
accounts for a larger fraction of wealth in low-wealth households than it is in high-wealth
households. However, this inference is not entirely robust because the results from the two
restricted samples point towards the prediction of CRRA.
25For the analysis in levels, not reported here, the estimated coefficients for the full
sample are insignificant in all three estimation methods and the results are largely the
same when the two restricted samples are used.
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4.5. Liquid wealth only
The definition of wealth most commonly analysed in previous studies is
liquid wealth -denoted here as wealth 3. Table 11 displays the results of first-
difference regressions for the case of liquid wealth. The estimates of TSLS
are insignificant in all the three samples, indicating that CRRA cannot be
rejected as the households’ risk preference model. This result is similar to
the other two panel studies based on liquid wealth, BN for the case of US
and CP for the case of Italian households.26
A conclusion that emerges from the results in this section is that the risk
profile of UK households would be characterised differently depending on
what is considered to be the most appropriate measure of wealth. Our results
suggest, overall, that households do not significantly change their share of
risky assets when narrow, and therefore, liquid levels of wealth change.27,28
5. Distribution of risk aversion
There are many instances where economic modellers and analysts focus on
a narrow definition of wealth such as liquid wealth, and it is therefore worth
examining the correlation between risk aversion and wealth levels under the
assumption of CRRA for the case of UK households.
26The point estimates of the estimation of the regression in levels for liquid wealth are
similar under the three different samples. The OLS and HT estimates are significantly pos-
itive, indicating DRRA; while the TSLS estimate is statistically insignificant, suggesting
that CRRA cannot be rejected.
27The cross-sectional analysis undertaken in this paper for all the different definitions
of wealth (available upon request) shows ambiguous results that are conditional on the
definition of wealth. The point estimates change from negative to zero or to positive
switching, accordingly, from IRRA to CRRA or to DRRA. This finding is consistent with
those in the early empirical literature based on cross-sectional data, such as Cohn et al.
(1975), Friend and Blume (1975), and Siegel and Hoban (1982). However, as pointed out
above, the cross-sectional analysis may be uninformative under heterogeneous preferences.
28Besides the two restricted samples reported in the tables –high levels of wealth and
large changes in wealth, we conduct further robustness tests that are available upon re-
quest. The results are generally similar to those above and, therefore, we only briefly
summarise the alternative sub-samples employed. We check the sensitivity of the results
to different age groups and house ownership. Another variation is the use of the ratio of
stock holdings over liquid wealth, rather than over liquid assets, for the definition of liquid
risky assets share.
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Assuming that agents hold the same market portfolio and that they have
homogeneous expectations, the normalized excess return term in equations
(2) and (3) is identical for all households. The distribution of relative risk
aversion can, in this case, be determined from the distribution of the share





This expression implies that, for the set of households with positive risky
assets holdings, the distribution of shares identifies that of risk aversion up
to a scale factor of E[Rm−Rf ]/σ2m . Following Chiappori and Paiella (2011),
we conduct a rough calibration and set E[Rm − Rf ] = 0.04 and σ2m = 0.2.
Accordingly, log γt = log(1/αt). The distribution of relative risk aversion is
shown in figure 1. More than ninety percent of the observations are associated
with a relative risk aversion lower than 5, and the mean is 2.39. This mean
estimate is similar to the one found by Friend and Blume (1975) and it implies
that investors require a substantially larger premium to hold equities or other
risky assets than they would if their attitudes toward risk were described by
commonly used utility functions such as the logarithmic one. The sample
correlation between measured risk aversion and wealth is −0.09. This small
negative correlation indicates that high wealth households are relatively less
risk averse under the assumption of CRRA for the case of liquid wealth.
To shed more light on the covariance between estimated risk aversion and
wealth, we split the sample based on household wealth and plot the distri-
bution of measured relative risk aversion for the lower and upper quartiles
in figure 2. Low-wealth households are associated with higher mean and me-
dian, indicating a higher risk aversion; while the high-wealth households are
generally less risk averse. This result is consistent with the evidence from the
cross-sectional regression analysis based on liquid wealth. In the absence of
a time dimension, cross-sectional analysis of UK households would conclude
that relative risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. However, this conclu-
sion would be misleading since we have shown that the distribution of risk
aversion is not independent of wealth —although with a quantitatively small
coefficient, and that preferences across households are heterogeneous.29
29Another case where CRRA cannot be rejected in our empirical analysis and therefore
it would be possible to identify the risk aversion parameter (up to a scale factor) using the
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6. Conclusions
We employ data from the Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) to exam-
ine, for the first time, UK households portfolio allocations in a multi-period
setting. The time dimension of the dataset allows researchers to undertake
the analysis of the marginal effect of changes in wealth on the decision to
invest in risky assets without the need to assume, contrary to cross-sectional
analysis, that risk aversion is independent of the distribution of wealth.
Although the analysis for narrow definitions of wealth, such as liquid
wealth, is interesting in itself –liquidity decisions–, a more comprehensive
study of households’ risk preferences needs to control for as many compo-
nents of background wealth as possible. A novelty of our study is the in-
clusion of pension wealth which, together with home equity, private business
equity, collectables and liquid wealth, makes it the broadest range of wealth
employed in this type of studies.
We highlight the following results. First, we do not find evidence of
DRRA which is suggested by, for instance, models of consumption habit
formation. Second, the inference about risk preferences depends crucially
on the control for background wealth. While empirical support for CRRA
is found for narrower measures of wealth —liquid wealth and liquid wealth
plus private business equity; IRRA is consistent with broader definitions of
wealth —those including home equity and pension wealth. The classification
of pension wealth as a risky investment rather than risk free would switch the
estimate of the elasticity of the risky asset share to total financial wealth to
zero, supporting a CRRA specification of the utility function. Third, these
results are in general robust to restricted samples of high levels of wealth
and large changes in wealth, although, in some cases, they are sensitive to
methods dealing with sample selection bias and measurement error.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics A: full sample, UK
Full sample
Variable Mean Tenth Median Ninetieth N
percentile percentile
Liquid wealth 85,345 2,483 31,438 194,662 6,712
Property wealth 207,364 16,521 143,201 416,053 6,712
Business wealth 59,347 0 0 2,553 6,712
Pension wealth 227,153 2,843 100,110 539,052 6,712
Collectables 2,686 0 0 2,490 6,712
Total wealth 581,894 73,902 337,486 1,129,614 6,712
Stock value 18,713 0 0 26,776 6,712
Total risky asset share 1 0.481 0.112 0.479 0.851 6,712
Total risky asset share 2 0.850 0.669 0.910 0.987 6,712
Risky asset share 1 0.733 0.330 0.820 0.973 6,712
Risky asset share 2 0.141 0 0 0.574 6,712
Liquid risky asset share 0.084 0 0 0.317 6,712
Market participation 0.31 0 0 1 6,712
Stock market entry 0.13 0 0 1 3,931
Stock market exit 0.25 0 0 1 2,781
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Table 2: Summary Statistics B : stock market participants, UK
Stock Market Participants
Variable Mean Tenth Median Ninetieth N
percentile percentile
Liquid wealth 162,378 12,770 80,445 350,501 2,098
Property wealth 305,098 74,347 207,484 605,315 2,098
Business wealth 61,904 0 0 25,230 2,098
Pension wealth 338,162 22,516 170,222 734,001 2,098
Collectables 5,087 0 0 4,695 2,098
Total wealth 872,628 195,481 578,432 1,646,741 2,098
Stock value 51,125 413 7,138 105,269 2,098
Total risky asset share 1 0.496 0.218 0.483 0.806 2,098
Total risky asset share 2 0.861 0.710 0.893 0.980 2,098
Risky asset share 1 0.766 0.527 0.800 0.962 2,098
Risky asset share 2 0.290 0.103 0.157 0.774 2,098
Liquid risky asset share 0.218 0.008 0.117 0.606 2,098
∆log total wealth 0.034 -0.408 0.034 0.499 2,098
∆log wealth 1 -0.022 -0.401 -0.037 0.388 2,098
∆log wealth 2 -0.031 -1.076 -0.016 0.990 2,098
∆log liquid wealth -0.034 -1.031 -0.015 0.937 2,098
∆ total risky asset share 1 -0.029 -0.225 -0.031 0.170 2,098
∆ total risky asset share 2 0.002 -0.118 0.001 0.131 2,098
∆ risky asset share 1 -0.006 -0.175 -0.010 0.167 2,098
∆ risky asset share 2 -0.028 -0.353 -0.014 0.301 2,098
∆liquid risky asset share -0.026 -0.317 -0.015 0.241 2,098
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Table 3: Summary Statistics C: full sample, US
Full Sample
Variable Mean Tenth Median Ninetieth N
percentile percentile
Liquid wealth 194,509 2,202 49,502 394,533 3,914
Property wealth 125,058 0 78,551 293,436 3,914
Business wealth 82,094 0 0 54,913 3,914
Financial wealth 476,560 18,669 197,686 895,532 3,914
Stock value 174,206 0 25,094 318,612 3,914
Liquid risky asset share 0.337 0 0.224 0.912 3,914
Financial risky asset share 0.668 0 0.751 0.988 3,914
Table 4: Summary Statistics D: stock market participants, US
Stock Market Participants
Variable Mean Tenth Median Ninetieth N
percentile percentile
Liquid wealth 325,217 17,566 119,676 609,059 1,798
Property wealth 176,049 0 120,827 394,274 1,798
Business wealth 114,755 0 0 110,485 1,798
Financial wealth 728,542 76,350 344,714 1,242,264 1,798
Stock value 238,237 5,491 60,276 416,193 1,798
Liquid risky asset share 0.575 0.154 0.576 0.962 1,798
Financial risky asset share 0.779 0.408 0.815 0.997 1,798
∆log liquid wealth 0.092 -1.244 0.034 1.468 1,798
∆log financial wealth 0.121 -0.646 0.113 0.895 1,798
∆liquid risky asset share -0.018 -0.467 -0.006 0.402 1,798
∆ financial risky asset share 0.007 -0.337 -0.002 0.325 1,798
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Table 5: Stock market entry and exit
Entry Exit
∆log total wealth 0.024* -0.065*
(0.003) (0.008)
Preference shifters Y Y
Life-cycle controls Y Y
Year-region FE Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.080
N 3,931 2,778
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes significance at




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Distribution of relative risk aversion
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Figure 2: Distribution of relative risk aversion: high and low liquid wealth
a
2:png
32
